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CONFIDENTIALITY IN ENVIRONMENTAL 
MEDIATION: SHOULD THIRD PARTIES HAVE 
ACCESS TO THE PROCESS? 
Karen L. Liepmann* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Environmental mediation is a new, rapidly growing field both 
within and outside of the legal profession. 1 The first explicit effort 
to mediate an environmental dispute dates from 1973.2 Since then, 
environmental mediation has gained in popularity as an alternative 
to the traditional, adjudicatory methods of environmental dispute 
resolution.3 Because environmental mediation is a new field, few 
statutes or common-law rules govern the process. This article fo-
cuses on one unresolved issue in environmental mediation: whether 
* Executive Editor, 1986-1987, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review. 
1 The courts have long recognized the right of parties to settle claims privately. See, e.g., 
Williams v. First Nat'l Bank, 216 U.S. 582, 595 (1910); United States v. City of Miami, 614 
F.2d 1322, 1330 (5th Cir. 1980). Many environmental mediators are not lawyers. For example, 
the mediator in the Port Townsend Ferry Terminal struggle was a history teacher, TALBOT, 
SETTLING THINGS, SIX CASE STUDIES IN ENVIRONMENTAL MEDIATION, 85 (1983), and Dr. 
Cormick, Director of the Office of Environmental Mediation in Seattle, Washington, has an 
academic background in business administration. 
2 Cormick, The Myth, the Reality, the Future of Environmental Mediation, 24 Env't, No. 
7, 14, 15 (1982). This dispute concerned a flood control/land use planning conflict in the 
Snoqualamie-Snohomish River basin near Seattle, Washington. See Cormick & Patton, En-
vironmental Mediation: Defining the Process Through Experience, in ENVIRONMENTAL ME-
DIATION: THE SEARCH FOR CONSENSUS (L. Lake ed. 1980) for a description of the dispute. 
For a more detailed history of environmental mediation see S. MERNITZ, MEDIATION OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES 65-73 (1980). For the purposes of this article, an environmental 
dispute is one that involves "decisions concerning fundamental and irreversible alterations in 
the physical environment." MCCARTHY, NEGOTIATING SETTLEMENTS: A GUIDE TO ENVIRON-
MENTAL MEDIATION, (1984). 
3 "[M]ediation has quickly become a bandwagon which attracts a large and diverse group of 
riders." G. Cormick, Environmental Mediation in the United States: Experience and Future 
Directions 2 (unpublished paper presented to the American Association for the Advancement 
of Science, 1981 Annual Meeting, Toronto, Canada) [hereinafter CORMICK, EXPERIENCE AND 
FUTURE DIRECTIONS]. 
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communications made by the parties during the mediation process 
are protected from compulsory process sought by third parties dur-
ing subsequent litigation.4 Specifically, this article addresses whether 
courts should grant environmental mediators a testimonial privi-
lege,5 and if so, what form should this privilege take? 
Environmental mediators assert that a guarantee of confidentiality 
of the communications among a mediator and the parties to a dispute 
is a fundamental characteristic of mediation,6 and they consider a 
4 A 1981 ABA Survey of Mediation Programs, on confidentiality, found that whether state-
ments made by participants during an alternative dispute resolution session can be used as 
evidence in a subsequent legal proceeding, is of predominant practical concern to dispute 
resolution programs. Freedman, Confidentiality: A Closer Look, in ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION: MEDIATION AND THE LAW: WILL REASON PREVAIL? 70 (Compiled by the Special 
Committee on Dispute Resolution, Public Services Division, American Bar Association (1983»; 
" ... there is an unresolved legal question as to whether ... [the mediators'] involvement 
should be regarded as confidential in any subsequent legal proceedings." G. Cormick, How 
And When Should You Mediate Natural Resource Disputes? 8-14 (unpublished paper pre-
sented to Alternatives to Litigation Seminar, Washington State Bar Association, July 26, 
1985) [hereinafter Cormick, Natural Resource Disputes]. 
Whether communications made during mediation are privileged from compulsory process 
sought by a party involved in the mediation (which could become an issue if negotiations broke 
down and the case ended up in court) is not discussed here. Almost all practicing environmental 
mediators require parties to disputes to sign confidentiality agreements guaranteeing that 
admissions or confessions made by one party may not be used against it by its adversaries if 
the negotiations break down and the case goes to trial. See, e.g., Freedman, supra, at 80. 
5 Because of judicial reluctance to grant privileges except in rare situations, see, e.g., United 
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 711-13 (1974), it is unlikely that any court would grant a 
common-law privilege to all mediators. This is especially so because there are no licensing 
requirements for, or procedures to check abuses by, environmental mediators. Anyone can 
hold him or herself out as a mediator. Granting a privilege to mediators generally could lead 
to abuses of the role and would also be too broad an exception to the general rule that the 
public is entitled to every person's evidence. Courts have, however, been more willing to 
carve out narrow, specific privileges for professionals such as accountants, labor arbitrators, 
and social workers. 
It is possible that the courts would create a narrow exception for environmental mediators 
because environmental mediators and environmental mediation are unique in a few significant 
ways. First, environmental mediation efforts are usually organized under the auspices of 
environmental mediation centers, some of which are associated with universities. See infra 
note 22. Second, the government is a party in many mediated environmental disputes. See 
infra notes 59-61, and accompanying text. This government participation lends legitimacy to 
the environmental mediator's participation. Finally, because of the number and complexity of 
claims, the large number of parties, the expense of litigation and the possible long range 
consequences of environmental disputes, the courts have encouraged environmental litigants 
to use extrajudicial methods for resolving their disputes. See infra note 89. 
6 McCrory, Environmental Mediatiorb-Another Piece for the Puzzle, 6 Vermont L. Rev. 
49, 56 (1981). In an affidavit filed in support of a successful motion to quash a subpoena served 
upon the mediator of an environmental dispute in Adler v. Adams, No. 673-7362 (W.D. Wash., 
1979) Robert Cauison, President of the American Arbitration Association, made the following 
statement regarding confidentiality: 
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promise of confidentiality to be a pre-requisite to successful media-
tion. 7 Unless environmental mediators are granted a testimonial 
privilege, and their written communications are protected from com-
pulsory process sought by third parties, environmental mediators 
may not be able to honor their promises of confidentiality. A lack of 
a testimonial privilege, they argue, will lead to a reduction in the 
use of environmental mediators. 8 
On the other hand, allowing mediators a testimonial privilege may 
result in abuses. It could also encourage parties who either want to 
avoid public disclosure of certain facts or the creation of adverse 
precedent, to shield themselves from public scrutiny by hiding their 
decision-making processes behind a screen of confidentiality. 
Allowing mediators a testimonial privilege may also impede the 
public's right to hear every person's evidence.9 Recognizing that the 
integrity of the judicial system depends on full disclosure of all the 
relevant facts, the United States Supreme Court has held that the 
public has a right to every person's evidence, "except for those 
persons protected by a constitutional, common-law or statutory priv-
ilege. "10 Such privileges are granted rarely and are designed to 
protect "weighty and legitimate competing interests . . . . "11 Most 
states protect the attorney-client,12 labor arbitrator-disputants, 13 
Public policy requires that mediators be privileged from disclosing information 
acquired in the course of their mediation duties. It is deponent's belief that the 
mediation process would be severely damaged if parties are not permitted to speak 
freely to the mediators. Coupled with free disclosure is the knowledge that the 
mediator may not subsequently make disclosures as a witness in some other pro-
ceeding to the possible disadvantage of a party to the mediation. Mediation's success 
depends upon total privacy. 
Deponent's experience is that without complete confidentiality the usefulness of 
third party intervention in the settlement of future disputes would be seriously 
impaired if not destroyed. 
7 New York, for example, only funds mediation programs if they guarantee confidentiality. 
See N.Y. JUD. LAW § 849-b(3)-b(6) (McKinney Supp. 19&'3-1984). 
8 E.g., McCrory, supra note 6 at 81-83; Defendant's Memorandum of Law in Support of 
Motion to Quash Subpoena or for Protective Order 7, Adler v. Adams, No. 673-73C2 (W.D. 
Wash. 1979). 
9 That the public is entitled to every person's evidence is well grounded in the common law. 
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 
438 (1932). 
10 Nixon, 418 U.S. at 709. 
11 I d. Such privileges are created only when "permitting a refusal to testify or excluding 
relevant evidence has a public good transcending the normally predominant principle of 
utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth." Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 
(1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
12 See 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2290-2329 (McNaughton rev. 1961). 
18 "Considerations of public policy are the reasons for the rule and like other judicial officers, 
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priest-penitent,14 and physician-15 and psychotherapist-patientl6 re-
lationships from judicial scrutiny by statute and/or common law. 
Some states have also created testimonial privileges for 
accountants17 and social workers. IS All of these protected relation-
ships turn on activities that society seeks to foster, and for which 
there are no realistic alternatives. If the judicial process were to 
intrude into such relationships, it would interfere with the achieve-
ment of the aims of these activities. 
Mediation differs from these activities because there is another 
way to achieve its goal-litigation. It is only because this recourse 
to litigation exists that the confidentiality of the mediator versus 
concealment of the facts issue arises. This conflict does not exist, in 
the other privileged relationships largely because concealment of the 
facts is an accepted, encouraged occurrence given the recognized 
necessity of the activities. Similarly, the argument for a judicial 
recognition of a privilege for environmental mediators hinges on a 
judicial decision to encourage mediation. For environmental media-
tors to persuade courts to protect confidentiality of communications, 
they need to show that mediation of environmental disputes is nec-
essary and desireable. They must also show that, in some cases, 
litigation is not a realistic alternative because it would neither serve 
the courts' search for the truth, nor the aims of the interested 
parties. 
Under current law however, there are few statutory guidelines 
regarding environmental mediators' privilege or the confidentiality 
[labor] arbitrators must be free from the fear of reprisals by an unsuccessful litigant. They 
must of necessity be uninfluenced by any fear of consequences for their acts." Babylon Milk 
and Cream Co. v. Horvitz, 151 N.Y.S.2d 221, 224 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Suff. Cty. 1956), aff'd 4 
App. Div. 2d 777, 165 N.Y.S.2d 717 (2d Dep't 1957). 
For similar holdings see Corey v. New York Stock Exch., 493 F. Supp. 51, 55 (D. Mich. 
1980); Hill v. Aro Corp., 263 F. Supp. 324 (D. 'Ohio 1967); Cahn v. International Ladies 
Garment Union, 203 F. Supp. 191, 194 (D. Pa. 1962), aff'd. 311 F.2d 113, 114-15 (3d Cir. 
1962); Hoosac Tunnel Dock and Elevator Co. v. O'Brien, 137 Mass. 424, 426, 50 Am. Rep. 
323,324 (1884); Jones v. Brown, 54 Iowa 74,6 N.W. 140, 142 (1880). 
14 Almost every state has adopted a priest-penitent privilege, most by legislation, but some 
by judicial decision. R. LEMPERT, AND S. SALTZBURG, A MODERN ApPROACH TO EVIDENCE, 
690-91 (1977). 
15 This privilege exists by statute in about two-thirds of the states. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 
§§ 2380-2391 (McNaughton rev. 1961). 
16 [d. at 666; see also FED. R. EVID. 504. 
17 About one-third of the states have created accountant-client privileges. LEMPERT AND 
SALTZBURG, supra note 14, at 735. 
18 Some courts have upheld a partial privilege for social workers. E.g., Scherz v. Scherz, 
110 Misc. 2d 137, 442 N.Y.S.2d 41 (1981) (the relevant statute did not expressly shield the 
identity of the client, but it did protect the communications of the clients made in the course 
of the social worker's employment). 
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of their notes and documents. 19 Nor is there widespread recognition 
by the states' common laws of an environmental mediator's privilege. 
To date only one federal court, and no state court, has held that 
such a privilege exists.20 
This Comment concludes that there is a need for the development 
of a common-law privilege for environmental mediators. The first 
section presents a general discussion of mediation, and then dis-
cusses the growth of environmental mediation, and the advantages 
of using environmental mediation to resolve environmental disputes. 
The second section considers the advantages and disadvantages of 
granting a privilege to environmental mediators and their documents 
arising out of the mediation process. The third section outlines Adler 
v. Adams21-a recent federal decision granting an environmental 
mediator's motion to suppress a subpoena duces tecum issued by a 
third party. Finally, the Comment discusses the applicability of Ad-
ler to the development of a commom-Iaw privilege for environmental 
mediators. This section considers whether the analysis the Adler 
court used is the best framework upon which to base such a privilege, 
and suggests possible alternatives to the Adler approach. 
II. ENVIRONMENTAL MEDIATION 
Mediation is a voluntary process during which a neutral mediator 
helps those involved in a dispute to explore and reconcile their 
differences. 22 Mediators have no authority to impose a settlement on 
19 Only a few recent state statutes provide complete confidentiality of communications made 
during mediation. See N.Y. JUD. LAW § 84-b(6) (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984) ("Any commu-
nication relating to the 'subject matter' of mediation is a 'confidential communication'''); OKLA. 
STAT. Tit. 12, § 1805(c) (Supp. 1983) (prohibiting disclosure of "any matters discussed" in 
mediation); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.600 (1983) (providing complete confidentiality). Other stat-
utes provide a more limited privilege. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-307 (Supp. 1983) ("Mediation 
proceedings shall be regarded as settlement negotiations .... "). 
20 Adler v. Adams, No. 673-73C2 (W.D. Wash. 1979). See infra notes 119-161 and accom-
panying text. 
21 Adler, No. 673-73C2. 
""See Cormick, Experience and Future Directions, supra note 3, at 1; Lake, Characterizirl{/ 
Environmental Mediation, in ENVIRONMENTAL MEDIATION: THE SEARCH FOR CONSENSUS 
(L. Lake, ed. 1980); and McCrory, supra note 6, at 52-57, for representative definitions of 
environmental mediation. 
Most environmental mediation efforts take place under the auspices of regional environ-
mental mediation centers. There are a growing number of groups involved in environmental 
dispute resolution, including: American Arbitration Association Research Institute, 140 West 
51st Street, New York, NY 10020; Center for Urban and Regional Research, Old Dominion 
University, Norfolk, VA 23508; Environmental Mediation International, Suite 801, 2033 M 
Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036; The Mediation Institute, 605 First Avenue, Suite 525, 
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the disputants. Instead, mediators help the disputants work together 
to identify issues, explore possible bases of agreement, accommodate 
the interests of other parties, structure future working relationships, 
and ultimately, to formulate their own settlement. Mediators con-
sider a conflict resolved only when the parties reach a solution that 
the parties themselves consider workable.23 Most environmental me-
diators possess no technical expertise in the matters and issues in 
dispute. 24 
One commentator has identified the following four traits as fun-
damental characteristics of mediation: 1) the neutrality of the me-
diator (both perceived and actual); 2) the voluntariness of the pro-
cess; 3) the confidentiality of the relationships between the 
mediator(s) and the parties; and 4) the procedural flexibility available 
to the mediator.25 Successful mediation efforts almost invariably 
meet all four of the above criteria. These basic characteristics of 
Seattle, WA 98104; The New England Environmental Mediation Center, 108 Lincoln Street, 
Boston, MA 02111; Project on Environmental Conflict, Upper Midwest Council, Federal 
Reserve Bank Building, Minneapolis, MN 55480; RESOLVE, Center for Environmental Con-
flict Resolution, 360 Bryant Street, Palo Alto, CA 94301; ROMCOE (Rocky Mountain Center 
on the Environment), 5500 Central Ave. Suite A, Boulder, CO 80301; Wisconsin Center for 
Public Policy, Environmental Mediation Project, 1605 Monroe Street, Madison, WI 53711. 
These centers are funded largely through grants from philanthropic foundations such as the 
Ford Foundation, the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, 
Atlantic Richfield, and the Mellon Foundation. MCCARTHY supra note 2, at 82. 
Some states do fund environmental mediation efforts, but limit their funding to specific 
types of disputes such as the siting of solid waste facilities. [d. at 83. Only New Jersey funds 
mediation services for a broad range of disputes. [d. Attempts to secure government funding 
for environmental mediation services have failed in the federal government, Massachusetts, 
and New York. [d. In 1974 Massachusetts rejected a proposal to fund the environmental 
mediation work of then secretary of the Massachusetts Executive Office of Environmental 
Affairs. [d. In 1980, the New York State Legislature turned down legislation that would have 
established and funded an environmental mediation center in Syracuse. [d. A proposB.J. to 
include environmental mediation under the jurisdiction of the Federal Mediation & Conciliation 
Service has met with legal, political, and administrative resistance. [d. at 84. In light of the 
heavy involvement of federal, state, and local governments and agencies as parties to envi-
ronmental disputes, perhaps it is wiser to continue to fund environmental mediation privately. 
Government funding of environmental mediation would be likely to raise questions of conflict 
of interest and impair the perceived or actual neutrality .and impartiality, which is a funda-
mental requirement of mediation. McCrory, supra note 6, at 56. On the other hand, TALBOT, 
supra note 1, at 100-01, believes that government funding is the ''most practical, long-range 
answer" because mediation serves the public interest and offers major benefits to government 
agencies. 
28 Cormick, Experience and Future Directions, supra note 3, at 1. See MCCARTHY, supra 
note 2, at 87-104 for three examples of settlement agreements to environmental disputes. 
24 "Arbitrators are judges chosen by the parties to decide the matters submitted to them, 
finally and without appeal." Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 344,349 (1954). 
25 McCrory, supra note 6, at 56. 
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mediation sustain the process and make it suitable to resolve a broad 
spectrum of disputes. 26 
Mediation is a cooperative, rather than adjudicatory or adversarial 
process; it gives disputing parties the opportunity to define and, if 
they want, preserve ongoing relationships.27 Nonetheless, mediation 
is not entirely independent from the judicial system because me-
diated settlements ultimately depend on the courts for implemen-
tation and enforcement. 28 The possibility of impending court action 
or a stalemate in the courts often precipitates mediation. 29 Mediation 
differs from arbitration because arbitrators, unlike mediators, are 
usually appointed by the courts to decide the matters submitted to 
them, and the parties are bound by their decisions. 30 Mediators, on 
the other hand, possess no decision-making authority. 
A. The Growth of Environmental Mediation 
Commentators cite many reasons for the rapid growth of the use 
of mediation to resolve environmental disputes. 31 The principle rea-
son for the rise in environmental mediation is the tremendous in-
26 Note, Protecting Confidentiality in Mediation, 48 HARV. L. REV. 441, 444 (1984) [here-
inafter Confidentiality in Mediation]. 
'ZI [d. 
28 TALBOT, supra note 1, at 97. 
29 [d. One dispute, which involved the location of the Storm King pump-storage plant on 
the Hudson River, was tied up in the courts for seventeen years before the parties reached 
agreement through mediation. See generally L. BACOW & M. WHEELER, ENVIRONMENTAL 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION 10-12 (1984) for a description of the Storm King dispute. 
30 Cormick, Natural Resource Disputes, supra note 4, at 8-13. Dr. Cormick cites four 
reasons why mediators need not have technical expertise. They are: 
First, "experts" have a tendency to rely on their own assumptions and values. Second, 
they have a tendency to filter information and communication based on their own 
assessment of the "facts." Third, there is the danger that discussions will tend to 
focus on technical matters, ignoring the basic value issues, and resulting in solutions 
that, while technically sound, do not represent an accommodation of the real differ-
ences that separate the parties. Finally, to the extent the mediator leads the parties 
to an agreement that he or she believes is appropriate, the parties will have a 
decreased sense of ownership and commitment, making implementation difficult. 
[d. at 8-13-8-14 
However, the mediator does have a responsibility to make him or herself sufficiently 
conversant with the issues in dispute and the legislative, legal and organizational 
environment within which they occur to be able to communicate effectively with the 
parties and to assist them in devising viable solutions. 
Cormick, Experience and Future Directions, supra note 3, at 13. 
3) See, L. Susskind and A. Weinstein, Towards a Theory of Environmental Dispute Reso-
lution, 9 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 311, 314-21 (1980-81); Lake, Environmental Conflict 
and Decisionmaking, in ENVIRONMENTAL MEDIATION: THE SEARCH FOR CONSENSUS 1 (L. 
Lake ed. 1980). 
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crease in environmental disputes since the 1960's.32 The emergence 
of alternative processes for resolving environmental disputes was 
one consequence of the surge of environmental disputes that arose 
after Congress enacted preemptive federal legislation on environ-
mental issues during the late 1960's and early 1970's.33 Acts such as 
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,34 the Clean Air Act 
Amendments of 1970,35 and the Clean Waters Act Amendments of 
1977,36 articulate national goals, set compliance deadlines, and del-
egate to federal agencies a major role in enforcing new federal 
standards.37 Federal courts soon became involved in reviewing chal-
lenged agency practices. Because federal courts agreed to review 
carefully all challenged administrative decisions in environmental 
cases,38 the courts were soon deluged with a flood of complex envi-
ronmental litigation. 39 The federal courts had very little precedent 
or statutory guidance on how to resolve equitably these disputes. 
This lack of guidance has led to what one commentator terms a "clear 
power situation." That is, many agencies, groups and individuals 
have standing to challenge, delay, or stop a project, but no group 
has the authority to commence or accomplish any planned objective. 40 
In the environmental arena, legislation and caselaw in the United 
States have created a clear power situation, often in what might 
be characterized as a no-win configuration for all concerned. 
Legislation has created elaborate processes for assessment and 
review of the environmental impact of proposed public and pri-
vate projects or programs. The courts are given the responsi-
bility to review the implementation of those procedures whose 
very complexity has provided' extensive bases for court chal-
lenge. 41 
32 One study reveals that environmental conflict is spreading geographically, once it emerges 
in a region it remains, and that the frequency of environmental conflict is rising in part because 
an increasing percentage of heavy industrial projects are encountering local opposition. Glad-
win, Environmental Conflict, 2 EIA REV. 48-49 (1978) quoted in BACOW AND WHEELER, 
supra note 29, at 3. 
33 Lake, supra note 31, at 1. 
34 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4321-4370a. 
35 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401-7642. 
36 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1376. 
37 Lake, supra note 31, at 1; Susskind and Weinstein, supra note 31, at 317. 
38 Lake, supra note 31, at 1. 
39 Id.; Susskind and Weinstein, supra note 31, at 317. 
40 Cormick, Mediating Environmental Controversies: Perspectives and First Experience, 2 
EARTH L.J. 215, 216 (1976). 
41Id. 
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Faced with this situation, and the courts' apparent administrative 
inability to deal with the complex technical, economic, and social 
issues involved in most environmental disputes,42 as well as dissat-
isfaction with costly, delay-ridden, winner-take-alliitigation, parties 
to environmental disputes are seeking alternative methods to resolve 
their conflicts. 
Mediation has emerged as one of the more popular alternative 
methods of resolving environmental disputes. Both the process of 
mediation itself and the unique problems engendered by environ-
mental disputes make mediation an attractive alternative. Generally, 
mediation is faster,43 less expensive,44 and provides solutions more 
satisfactory to all the parties than does litigation. By definition, a 
settlement reached through mediation is an efficient outcome; all the 
disputants and stakeholders prefer it to no agreement at all, or to 
any other feasible outcome. 45 
B. The Advantages of Environmental Mediation 
Mediation is an especially appropriate method of alternative dis-
pute resolution for environmental conflicts for a number of reasons. 
First, environmental disputes usually involve many parties, each 
with its distinct issues and needs.46 Courts do not have the time, 
facilities, or trained personnel to handle the multiplicity of complex 
42 See, e.g., Boyer, Alternatives to Administrative Trial-Type Hearings for Resolving Com-
plex Scientific, Economic and Social Issues, 71 MICH. L. REV. 111 (1972); Bardach and 
Pugliaresi, The Environmental Impact Statement vs. The Real World, 49 PUB. INT. 22 (1977); 
"[clourts are of limited utility in examining difficult economic problems." United States v. 
Topco Assocs. Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 609 (1972). 
43 For example, a dispute over the extension of Interstate 90 into Seattle, Washington was 
successfully mediated in ten months. Before the parties agreed to mediate, estimates of how 
much longer the dispute would be tied up in the courts ranged from one to five years, with 
an estimated escalation cost of $140,000 per day. Cormick and Patton, supra note 2, at 92. 
44 Id. 
45 L. SUSSKIND, L. BACOW AND M. WHEELER, RESOLVING ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES 2 
(1983). See also Zartman, Negotiation as a Joint Decision-Making Process, J. CONFLICT 
RESOLUTION 63 (Dec. 1976) (defining mediation as a positive-sum exercise). 
46 For example, the Storm King dispute regarding the building of a pump-storage plant on 
the Hudson River involved three environmental groups, four public agencies, and five electric 
utility companies. The parties involved were: Scenic Hudson, the Natural Resources Defense 
Council, and the Hudson River Fisherman's Association. The public agencies were: the En-
vironmental Protection Agency, the New York State Department of Environmental Conser-
vation, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. 
The utility companies were: Consolidated Edison, Orange and Rockland Utilities, Central 
Hudson Gas & Electric, Niagara Mohawk, and the New York State Power Authority. TALBOT, 
supra note 1, at 7. 
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issues,47 the many conflicting interests, and the tremendous number 
of documents48 involved in such mUltiparty cases. 
Environmental disputes often involve complex economic, techni-
cal, and scientific matters, about which most judges have little train-
ing. This lack of specific training and background makes it especially 
difficult and time-consuming for judges to reach equitable solutions. 
Mediation reduces this problem of adjudicators' lack of technical 
expertise. Mediators and judges do not need to possess the same 
level of technical expertise because of the difference in the nature 
of their roles in the resolution of environmental disputes. 49 Judges 
are adjudicators and fact finders. Their role is to examine all the 
evidence and produce a decision based on the facts of the case. 
Furthermore, judges write opinions. To do this successfully, judges 
must comprehend all of the technical, scientific data presented by 
the parties. Mediators, on the other hand, act mainly as facilitators. 50 
While their role does require familiarity with the legal and factual 
issues,51 the mediators' role does not require them to have a sophis-
ticated understanding of all the technical specifics. 52 
In mediation, the parties serve as the ultimate adjudicators and 
fact finders. It is important therefore, that they, more so than me-
diators, understand the technical facts. One goal of cooperative dis-
pute resolution is for the parties to acquire this information through 
educating each other as to their respective positions. 53 Ideally, this 
educational process also helps each party to become aware of the 
legitimacy of the others' position. As a result of this acquisition of 
information about the other parties' position, parties to the dispute 
are often more willing and likely to compromise. 54 
Educating the other parties is an especially important function of 
environmental dispute resolution for two reasons. First, environ-
47 See D. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY (1977). Chief Judge David L. Bazelon 
of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has been especially 
articulate about the discomfort of judges when required to arbitrate complex and disputed 
scientific information. He believes that "the courts are not the proper forum either to resolve 
the factual disputes, or to make the painful value choices on technical and scientific issues." 
MCCARTHY, supra note 2, at 55, quoting the judge. 
48 For example, in the seventeen years the Storm King dispute was in the courts, the 
administrative record alone totaled about 200,000 pages. BACOW AND WEINSTEIN, supra note 
29, at II. 
49 See supra note 24 and accompanying text for a discussion of mediators and technical 
expertise. 
50 See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text. 
5! See supra note 24. 
52 [d. 
63 SUSSKIND, BACOW, AND WHEELER, supra note 45, at 257. 
54 See, e.g., id. regarding the EPA's change of position in the Brayton Point Dispute. 
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mental science is not advanced enough for anyone to predict accu-
rately the environmental costs and benefits of any party's claims. 
Second, most disputants have legitimate and scientifically substan-
tiable positions, of which all decision makers should be aware. Thus, 
working together to reach an agreement satisfactory to the largest 
number of groups will provide a more even-handed and value-free 
solution than would a decision by a single judge. As one environ-
mental mediator has stated, the lack of knowledge regarding envi-
ronmental science "reduces the effectiveness of the courts in [envi-
ronmental] disputes because all the courts can do is decide which 
experts to believe."55 
As is the case during litigation, parties involved in mediation hire 
technical experts. In mediation though, the parties use mutually 
agreed upon experts and jointly devised and managed research ef-
forts. 56 This cooperative use of experts helps contain costs and avoids 
the battle of the experts that is common in litigation. Adjudication 
based on settlements reached through compromise and understand-
ing rather than on the credibility of disagreeing experts is prefer-
able, especially in environmental cases, where the outcomes often 
significantly and permanently affect large numbers of people. 
Another reason why mediation may be a more satisfactory tech-
nique than judicial adjudication for resolving environmental disputes 
is the lack of precedent on many environmental issues. Most current 
environmental cases hinge on interpretations of such relatively re-
cent statutes such as the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980.57 This lack of pertinent 
caselaw, combined with a lack of specific scientific environmental 
knowledge, and the difficulty in predicting how certain measures will 
affect the environment, make it difficult to predict who would win if 
a case went to court. Indeed, it is difficult to know what would be a 
"win." For example, the construction of a power plant on a shoreline 
may threaten the coastal ecosystem depending on whether specifi-
cally designed pollution control devices turn out to be effective. If 
the technology is new or the geology unique, no one can be absolutely 
sure of all the consequences. 58 In such cases, flexible settlements 
that allow for renegotiation are preferable, for both the disputants 
and the courts, to court-ordered solutions where the parties must 
return to court if the original solutions prove unworkable. 
55Id. 
56 Cormick, Natural Resource Disputes, supra note 4, at 8-16. 
57 42 U.S.C. 9601 et seq. 
58 Id. at 5-6. 
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Finally, mediation may be preferable to litigation in environmental 
disputes because the parties to environmental disputes often are, 
and must continue to be, involved in ongoing relationships with each 
other. Neighboring cities and towns,59 different federal and state 
agencies,60 and utilities and the towns and states in which they are 
10cated,61 often oppose each other in environmental disputes. These 
opposing parties cannot choose to terminate their relationships as 
easily as can litigants who are not locked into ongoing relationships. 
Unlike litigation, mediation encourages disputants to resolve their 
present disagreements and provides a forum in which they may 
structure, preserve, or redefine their relationships. 62 
In spite of the many advantages mediation has over litigation for 
resolving environmental disputes, only approximately ten percent of 
environmental disputes can be mediated successfully.63 Generally, 
mediation becomes a feasible choice only when the issues are clearly 
defined,64 the disputants perceive that a balance of power exists 
among themselves, and the parties realize they cannot achieve their 
objectives without negotiaton.65 Issues involving broad policy deci-
sions or having ideological overtones (i.e., anti-nuclear), in which 
the principles involved are so important to the parties that they may 
not be likely or willing to compromise, are not appropriate for me-
diation. 66 Other disputes inappropriate for mediation are those in 
which one party wants to create judicial precedent (and would thus 
rather litigate), or where one party would rather delay the action 
than work to end the conflict, or where the parties are unable to 
59 E.g., the 1-90 dispute, see infra notes 119-61, and accompanying text; the Eau Claire 
Wisconsin Landfill dispute, TALBOT, supra note 1, at xiii. 
60 E.g., the Storm King dispute, see supra note 29; the 1-90 dispute, see infra notes 119-
61, and accompanying text. 
6! E.g., the Hydro-Power at Swan Lake dispute, TALBOT supra note 1, at xii; the Greylocks 
Dam dispute, BACOW AND WEINSTEIN, supra note 29, at 46-50. 
62 Note, Confidentiality in Mediation, supra note 26, at 444. Susskind and Weinstein have 
found that mediation leads to an increase over litigation in the likelihood of achieving stable 
agreements-that is, agreements honored by all parties for at least seven years. SUSSKIND 
AND WEINSTEIN, supra note 31, at 312-13. 
63 TALBOT, supra note 1, at 91 (quoting Howard Bellman, an environmental mediator who 
worked on a dispute among towns and state agencies over the location of a landfill in Wis-
consin). 
64 Cormick, Natural Resource Disputes, supra note 4, at 8-18; TALBOT, supra note 1, at 
9l. 
65 TALBOT, supra note 1, at 9l. 
66 Jd.; Cormick, Natural Resource Disputes, supra note 4, at 8-18. 
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make a long-term commitment. 67 Thus, although mediation has many 
advantages over litigation, courts will continue to resolve the ma-
jority of environmental disputes because the parties are unwilling 
or unable to make the compromises mediation requires. 
III. SHOULD A PRIVILEGE BE GRANTED? 
Once the parties to an environmental dispute agree to mediate, 
the question remains whether an environmental mediator's commu-
nications, either written or oral, made during mediation should be 
protected from compulsory process sought by groups not parties to 
mediated settlement agreements. Legitimate arguments exist on 
both sides of this issue. 68 
Opponents to an environmental mediator's privilege argue that 
neither public policy nor common law supports such a privilege and 
that there are no compelling policy reasons to change the status 
qUO. 69 That the public is entitled to every person's evidence is a 
presumption deeply rooted in the common law. 70 The policy behind 
this presumption is that the "underlying aim of judicial inquiry is 
ascertainable truth .... "71 Thus, all evidence "rationally related" 
to determining the truth is presumed admissible. 72 Mediators are 
sometimes the sole sources of information relevant to a plaintiff's 
case. 73 Thus, if environmental mediators and their records were 
immune from discovery, the plaintiff might be barred from relief 
because a mediator was the sole source of relevant information. Such 
a result could have especially grave consequences in environmental 
cases, where the outcomes of disputes may significantly and per-
manently affect the environment and large numbers of people. 
Another reason why some oppose granting a privilege to environ-
mental mediators and their records is to avoid unscrupUlous parties 
67 TALBOT, supra note 1, at 94, 95; Cormick, Natural Resource Disputes, supra note 4, at 
8-18. 
68 Many of the arguments regarding an environmental mediator's privilege may also apply 
to a privilege for all mediators. But, the nature of environmental mediation is such that often 
arguments are especially germane to a privilege limited to environmental mediators. 
69 Memorandum in Support of Application for Review of Order on Motion to Quash Subpeona 
or for Protective Order 1-2, Adler v. Adams, No. 673-73C2 (W.D. Wash. 1979) [hereinafter 
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Review]. 
70 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 
421 (1932). 
71 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
72Id. 
73 For example, this was a disputed issue in the Adler case. See infra text accompanying 
notes 222-25. 
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from choosing to mediate to escape public disclosure of certain facts 
and information. 74 This is especially undesirable when public officials 
and agencies are involved in the mediation process, as is very often 
the case. 75 Confidentiality would permit public officials, whose ac-
tions are otherwise subject to close public scrutiny, to shield them-
selves from such scrutiny by choosing to mediate. Confidential me-
diation involving public officials and agencies may also be challenged 
in some jurisdictions because it would violate open meeting laws. In 
addition to this accountability issue, granting a privilege to environ-
mental mediators raises a problem of delegation. The public has 
delegated certain administrative decisionmaking tasks to its elected 
officials and public agencies. For these public officials to in turn 
delegate these responsibilities to members of the private sector-
namely, environmental mediators~reates a potential delegation 
problem. 
Some advocates of unlimited discovery of the environmental me-
diation process argue that because there are no licensing or quality 
control procedures to ensure the ethical behavior of environmental 
mediators, their records must be discoverable to deter dishonest 
practices in mediation. 76 There are no guidelines regarding to whom 
and how environmental mediators are accountable. 77 That is, there 
is no process for those affected by the actions of environmental 
mediators to chastise, sue or fire them.78 On the other hand, The 
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service and The American Ar-
bitration Association govern labor arbitrators, who do have a judi-
cially recognized privilege. A labor arbitrator's failure to comply 
with applicable regulations can result in disaccreditation. 79 Labor 
mediators may also be sued if they violate statutes or caselaw on 
proper mediation procedure.80 Furthermore, the parties to labor 
disputes may discharge labor mediators. 81 Because there are no 
regulations governing who may mediate environmental disputes, 
environmental mediators are not required to be, and often are not ,82 
74 See, e.g., Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Review, supra note 69. 
75 See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text. 
76 See, e.g., Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Review, supra note 69. 
77 Nor does the mediation process offer any checks to prevent the parties from telling each 
other lies or from snowing each other with irrelevant information. Unlike litigation, sanctions 
for perjured testimony and contempt of court are not available to mediating parties. 
78 Susskind, Environmental Mediation and the Accountability Problem, 6 VERMONT L. 
REV. 1, 4 (1981). 
79Id. at 5. 
fYJ Id. 
81Id. 
82 See supra note 1. 
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attorneys. Consequently, they are not bound by state and federal 
rules of professional conduct. Unlike labor mediators, who usually 
mediate as a career, environmental mediation is often undertaken 
by "one time only" mediators, on whose future careers attempts to 
discharge them would have little effect. 83 For all of the above rea-
sons, until accreditation, procedural, and sanctioning regulations 
similar to those governing labor mediators are established for envi-
ronmental mediators, the threat of possible judicial review may be 
the best way to police environmental mediators and environmental 
mediation. 84 
Finally, if environmental mediation efforts were not discoverable, 
there would be no way for those not represented in the mediation 
process to ascertain whether their interests were fairly and ade-
quately considered. This possible lack of adequate representation 
presents a potential due process problem. The government is decid-
ing issues that affect large numbers of people who have no access to 
the decisionmaking process, and are thus denied a full and fair 
hearing on the facts. 85 Although ideally environmental mediation 
would include representatives of every party, in reality this cannot 
be. Often parties either cannot afford or refuse to join the mediation 
process; other times, some parties are excluded from the process for 
political reasons. 86 
On the other hand, mediators argue that the confidential nature 
of their relationships with the disputants is critical to their success 
as mediators.87 Confidentiality allows the parties to engage in frank 
discussions without fear that their statements will be made public. 
83 Susskind, supra note 78, at 5. 
84 If most environmental mediation efforts continue to be mediated by "one time only" 
mediators, such sanctions and licensing requirements would have little effect, except perhaps 
to discourage one time only mediators by requiring them to obtain licenses. If, however, the 
current trend toward establishing environmental mediation centers continues, fewer environ-
mental mediators will be one time only participants, and it may thus become more feasible to 
police environmental mediation efforts through the promulgation of accreditation, procedural 
and sanctioning regulations. See generally McCrory, supra note 6 for a discussion on insti-
tutionalizing environmental mediation. 
86 The Adler plaintiffs alleged that the defendant environmental mediators violated their 
due process rights by not allowing the plaintiffs access to the records of the mediators. The 
Adler court did not address this contention directly. Instead, the court concentrated its 
decision and analysis on the procedural and policy reasons for granting environmental media-
tors a testimonial privilege. See infra notes 117-87 and accompanying text. 
86 For example, in the 1-90 dispute, environmental and neighborhood groups, claiming to 
represent a majority of citizens in Seattle were not invited to join in the mediation process. 
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Review, supra note 69. 
87 See, e.g., Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Quash Subpeona or for Protective 
Order 4-5, Adler v. Adams, No. 673-73C2 (W.D. Wash. 1979) [hereinafter Memorandum in 
Support of Motion to Quash]. 
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Absent a guarantee of confidentiality, the candor that such confiden-
tiality encourages would be lost. 88 
Many judges encourage parties to use alternative forms of dispute 
resolution. 89 Chief Judge Bazelon of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia believes that judges are uncom-
fortable when required to decide cases that involve complex and 
disputed scientific information. 90 He has stated that "the courts are 
not the proper forum either to resolve the factual disputes, or to 
make the painful value choices on technical and scientific issues. "91 
Thus, to entice parties to use alternative forms of dispute resolution, 
such as mediation, it is important that the courts and legislatures 
make alternative forms attractive to disputants. Making mediation 
attractive to the disputants is especially important in the environ-
mental arena, where there are many compelling reasons to use me-
diation rather than litigation to resolve disputes. 92 
Absent a privilege, third parties could subpoena mediators and 
request their testimony regarding issues discussed during the me-
diation process. Forcing mediators to testify and compelling produc-
tion of a mediator's notes would discourage mediators and parties 
from choosing to mediate. Mediators would have to be concerned 
with keeping a clear record that would withstand judicial scrutiny 
of the mediaton process. 93 Such a requirement would tend to for-
malize the mediation process and impede the free flow of thoughts 
and ideas. 94 Mediators would also be less willing to use unusual or 
unconventional strategies to reach compromises if they knew their 
actions might be reviewed in court. 95 Some mediators have re-
88 "It is only through frank and open discussions with the parties that the mediator can 
identify and explore areas of flexibility in a party's negotiating stance." [d. at 6-7. 
89 E.g., Warren Burger, Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court has encouraged 
a "policy of favoring extrajudicial methods of resolving disputes .... " Barrentine v. Arkan-
sas-Best Freight System, 450 U.S. 728, 748 (1980) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
90 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, at 55 (quoting the Judge). 
91 [d. 
92 See supra notes 46-62, and accompanying text. 
93 MCCRORY, supra note 6, at 82. 
94 See, e.g., Memorandum in Support of Motion to Quash, supra note 87, at 4. 
95 [d.; MCCRORY, supra note 6 at 82. 
Mediators [now] have procedural flexibility not available to judges or to decision-
makers who function in a quasi-judicial capacity. They need not be concerned with 
prohibitions against ex-parte communications, with supervising the formation of a 
record or with other formalities which would prohibit or impair confidential relation-
ships with the parties and would inhibit settlement efforts. A mediator may adopt 
procedures or methods of operation which meet the needs of each situation, and may 
alter those procedures if the need arises. 
MCCRORY, supra note 6, at 56. 
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sponded to the threat of a subpoena of their records by refusing to 
keep records. 96 This type of self-defeating logic is not a viable long-
term solution to the problem. Instead, it merely sidesteps the issue 
at the price of decreased efficiency and professionalism. 
As long as mediators cannot guarantee protection of confidences 
made during mediation against compulsory process sought by third 
parties, disputants will be less willing to mediate. They would be 
less willing to participate in open discussions and brainstorming 
sessions if their ideas could possibly be scrutinized by a court or 
used against them in a lawsuit. 97 In short, "if a mediator could be 
sued, form would prevail over substance and procedural flexibility 
would be the victim. "98 
A final reason why proponents of the privilege argue that media-
tors' notes should be confidential is that they often reflect a media-
tor's mental impressions and speculations for future use in negotia-
tions. 99 Because the notes are interpretive, these speculations and 
impressions are not always accurate. Public disclosure of these notes 
could thus be more misleading than helpful. 100 
IV. How SHOULD A PRIVILEGE BE GRANTED? 
A. Federal Rule of Evidence 408 
Commentators and the courts have proposed guidelines for the 
creation of a common-law privilege for environmental mediators. One 
rationale for granting environmental mediators and their work a 
common-law privilege is Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 408. 101 
FRE 408 provides that an offer to compromise is "not admissible to 
prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its amount. "102 FRE 
408 further provides that "[e]vidence of conduct or statements made 
in compromise negotiations is likewise inadmissible. "103 The under-
lying policy of FRE 408-to provide "free and frank" discussions of 
96 Guidelines for mediators affiliated with a Florida Dispute Resolution Program advise: "If 
notes are taken during a mediation hearing . . . once the procedure is over, discard whatever 
is not required to adequately maintain the files." Freedman, supra note 4, at 83 (quoting 
Comment 4, Revision of Local Rule (proposed) of the guidelines for the Citizens Dispute 
Settlement Program in Florida, July 27, 1983). 
97 Memorandum in Support of Motion to Quash, supra note 87, at 7. 
98 MCCRORY, supra note 6, at 82. 
99 Memorandum in Support of Motion to Quash, supra note 87, at 5. 
100 ld. 
101 FED. R. EVID. 408. 
1021d. 
103 ld. 
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settlement proposals104-is also a goal of mediation. Thus, although 
FRE 408 has traditionally been used only in the context of pending 
litigation, the language and policy behind the rule may be construed 
to include mediation programs. 105 
A major limitation with using FRE 408 to protect mediators' 
common-law privilege is it excludes evidence of negotiations only 
when offered to prove the validity or amount of a plaintiff's claim; 
and the rule does not exclude evidence offered to prove or challenge 
the actual settlement agreement that arose from the negotiations. 106 
Thus, FRE 408 would not be relevant in a case such as Adler v. 
Adams,107 where the plaintiffs challenged the legality of the settle-
ment agreement. 
B. The Relevancy Rule 
In jurisdictions that have not enacted FRE 408, mediators may 
argue that the "relevancy rule" protects their communications and 
testimony from disclosure to third parties. This common-law doctrine 
excludes from evidence all offers to compromise made during nego-
tiations.108 The relevancy rule is based on the premise that such 
offers to compromise are not reliable evidence of the offeror's 
claim.109 The relevancy rule forces courts to distinguish between 
offers to compromise and admissible independent admissions of fact. 
This potentially arbitrary distinction has garnered criticism from 
many sources. 110 Furthermore, the logic behind the relevancy rule 
does not support a privilege for mediators. The exclusion was in-
tended merely to ensure the probative value of the evidence rather 
than encourage settlement negotiations. 111 Thus, the relevancy rule 
offers even less protection to mediator's communications than does 
FRE 408. 
104 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE ~ 408 [01] at 408-09. 
105 " ••• expansion of the rule's coverage to mediation programs is a logical step in promoting 
the underlying policy considerations." Friedman, Protection of Confidentiality in the Media-
tion of Minor Disputes, 11 CAP. U.L. REV. 181, 205 (1981); " ... the language and the logic 
of the rule [408] clearly would appear to encompass mediation programs." Freedman, supra 
note 4, at 75. 
106 Note, Confidentiality in Mediation, supra note 26, at 449. 
107 No. 673-73C2 (W.D. Wash. 1979). 
108 4 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1061, at 36 (J. Chadbourne 
rev. ed. 1972). 
109 [d. 
110 See Note, Confidentiality in Mediation, supra note 26, at 447-48. 
111 [d. at 447. 
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C. A Balancing Test 
Many commentators advocate that the courts use a balancing test 
to grant a privilege to environmental mediators.1l2 With this test, 
courts would weigh the benefits of free discovery against policy 
considerations that favor protecting confidential communications. 
Traditional legal doctrine supports the use of such a test to establish 
a claim of privilege. 113 Professor Wigmore has developed four criteria 
to decide whether to grant a claim of privilege. 114 They are: 
1. The communications must originate in confidence that they 
will not be disclosed. 2. The element of confidentiality must be 
essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation 
between the parties. 3. The relation must be one which in the 
opinion of the community ought to be sedulously fostered. 4. The 
injury that would inure to the relations by the disclosure of the 
communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained 
for the correct disposal of the litigation. 115 
Two cases that have used a balancing test to find a privilege for 
mediators against third parties seeking confidential information are 
Richards of Rockford, Inc. v. Pacific Gas & Electric CO.,116 and 
Adler v. Adams. 117 These two cases, though, ultimately fail as prec-
edent because they fail to resolve the key policy problem: the pro-
tection of confidences versus the public's right to know. Instead, 
Richards and Adler approach the issue of confidentiality with a fact-
bound test that only peripherally addresses the public policy con-
cerns that Wigmore's analysis raises. 118 
V. ADLER V. ADAMS 
Adler involved an attempt by third parties to subpoena the me-
diator and discover documents generated during the mediation of a 
dispute among municipalities and state agencies over the proposed 
extension of an interstate highway.119 In Adler, the United States 
District Court for the Western District of Washington State consid-
ered two issues: whether to grant an environmental mediator a 
112 See, e.g., Freedman, supra note 4, at 77; Memorandum in Support of Motion to Quash, 
supra note 87, at 6. 
113 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2285 (McNaughton rev. 1961). 
114Id. 
115Id. (emphasis in original). 
116 71 F.R.D. 388 (N.D. Cal. 1976). 
117 Adler v. Adams, No. 673-67C2 (W.D. Wash. 1979). 
118 See infra notes 168-70 and accompanying text. 
119 Memorandum in support of Motion to Quash, supra note 87, at 2. 
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testimonial privilege, and whether the mediator's documents arising 
out of the mediation process of the dispute were protected from 
compulsory process. 120 
In 1964, the Washington State Highway Department proposed the 
construction of a ten-lane highway to link Seattle to the eastern 
towns of Bellevue and Mercer Island. 121 The Seattle City Council, 
and neighborhood environmental groups such as the Washington 
Environmental Council, a coalition of major environmental organi-
zations in Washington State, opposed this plan. 122 Opponents argued 
that the proposed highway would reduce property values, and that 
the city's emphasis should be on improving the public transit system 
rather than building more lanes for private automobile traffic. 123 In 
1973, these groups successfully challenged the first environmental 
impact statement for 1-90 that the State Highway Department had 
prepared. 124 The groups argued that the Highway Department had 
not sufficiently examined mass-transit alternatives to 1_90. 125 
By 1975, in response to this opposition, the Highway Department 
had scaled down the proposed project to six new lanes and incor-
porated an existing four-lane floating bridge into the interstate plan. 
Of these ten lanes, eight were to be automobile lanes, and two were 
to be transit lanes (commonly referred to as a 4-2T -4 configura-
tion).126 This revised plan still did not satisfy the environmental and 
neighborhood groups. They objected to the new proposal for the 
same reasons they had opposed the original plan: the highway would 
adversely affect the neighborhoods around the new road, and it 
would be more prudent to upgrade the mass-transit system in light 
of the energy crisis. 127 These groups exerted tremendous pressure 
on the Seattle City Council to oppose the plan. 128 
On the other side of the controversy were the outlying communi-
ties of Bellevue and Mercer Island, whose residents faced a con-
gested daily commute to Seattle on deteriorating roads and 
bridges. 129 The Metropolitan Transit Authority ("Metro") also sup-
120 [d. 
121 TALBOT, supra note 1, at 27. 




126 Cormick and Patton, supra note 1, at 92; TALBOT, supra note 1, at 29. 
127 [d. 
128 TALBOT, supra note 1, at 30. 
129 [d. at 27-28. 
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ported the 4-2T -4 configuration because it gave the Metro two new, 
much-needed rapid transit lanes into Seattle. 130 
While this dispute was being fought both in and out of the courts, 
Congress amended the Interstate Highway Act, which provided for 
ninety percent Federal financing for interstate roads.l3l The 1974 
Amendments allowed states to reassign some of the money allocated 
for highway construction in urban areas to other transportation 
projects, including mass transit. 132 This development delayed the 
commencement of construction of the 1-90 extension for another two 
years while Seattle, Mercer Island, Bellevue and nearby King 
County debated whether to trade the highway funds for mass tran-
sit. By January of 1976, all of the towns had voted against the 
reallocation. 133 
Thus, after twelve years of dispute, how, where, and even whether 
to extend the interstate remained unsolved. Estimates of how much 
longer the project would be tied up in the courts ranged from one 
to five years. 134 The costs of this delay were astronomical. The price 
of the $500 million proj ect was escalating at the rate of approximately 
$140,000 per day.135 Although the ultimate decision about whether 
and how to extend 1-90 rested with the State Highway Commission, 
the Commission did not want to go ahead with any plan unless the 
affected communities agreed on the exact number of lanes and how 
they were to be used. 136 The Highway Department believed that the 
project could withstand an expected legal attack on the revised 
Environmental Impact Statement from the neighborhood and envi-
ronmental groups only if the affected communities supported the 
highway construction. 137 Thus, the decision to mediate was a tactical 
one. 
In February 1976, the Highway Department asked two mediators 
from the Office of Environmental Mediation (OEM) to work with 
Seattle, Mercer Island, Bellevue, King County, and the Metro to 
resolve their conflicts.l38 The environmental and neighborhood 
groups that opposed the highway construction did not join the me-
130 Cormick and Patton, supra note 2, at 93. 
131 TALBOT, supra note 1, at 28. 
132Id. 
133Id. at 29--30. 
134 Cormick and Patton, supra note 2, at 92. 
135Id. 
136 TALBOT, supra note 1, at 31. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. The OEM is a privately-funded, non-profit environmental dispute resolution service. 
Cormick, Experience and Future Directions, supra note 3, at 18. 
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diation process. 139 The Highway Department, Mercer Island, and 
Bellevue resisted including these groups, and the groups refused to 
be bound by any settlements that arose out of the mediation. 140 
The participants in the mediation process were elected officials 
who formally represented the four communities, and representatives 
from the Department of Highways, and the Metro, and the State 
Highway Commission. 141 
During the mediation process, the formal negotiation sessions 
were open to the public, and covered by the media. 142 Several of 
these open meetings were televised. 143 Throughout the process, the 
mediators held informal briefing sessions for the opposing environ-
mental and neighborhood groupS.144 Most of the mediation effort, 
however, was not made public. Instead, the process consisted of 
caucuses among the parties, with the mediators functioning as mes-
sengers, and informal discussions between the mediators and each 
of the parties, where the mediators made strategic suggestions and 
explored possible areas of accommodation. 145 
By November 1976, nine months after formal mediations began, 
the parties reached a settlement. 146 Their agreement called for a 3-
2T-3 lane configuration with special access lanes for carpools and 
traffic originating on Mercer Island. 147 The settlement also called for 
improvements in transit inter-connections to Bellevue and Seattle. 148 
The highway was to be lidded over in parts of Bellevue and Seattle 
to lessen the environmental impact on the neighborhoods and to 
encourage urban redevelopment.149 Finally, the agreement estab-
lished joint committees of citizens and elected officials to assist in 
the planning and overseeing implementation of the project. 150 
A subsequent legal challenge to the revised environmental impact 
statement by the opposing groups failed. 151 Then, in April 1979, Dr. 
139 Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Review, supra note 69, at 2. 
140 TALBOT, supra note 1, at 33. 
141 Cormick and Patton, supra note 2, at 94. 
142 [d. at 95. 
143 [d. 
144 TALBOT, supra note 1, at 33. 
145 Memorandum in Support of Motion to Quash, supra note 87, at 4. 





161 TALBOT, supra note 1, at 38. 
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Cormick, one of the two mediators involved in the settlement agree-
ment, received a subpoena duces tecum ordering him to testify on 
behalf of the environmental groups who were not represented in the 
mediation process. 152 The subpoena also ordered Dr. Cormick to 
produce 
[a]ll documents and records of any kind pertaining to the back-
ground of circumstances surrounding, and accomplishment of the 
"negotiated settlement" between Seattle, King County, the State 
Highway Department, and Eastside cities, as the improvements 
on the 1-90 corridor between 1-405 and 1-5, including handwrit-
ten notes, memoranda, notes and telephone conversations, file 
memoranda, correspondence, and contracts of employment. 153 
Dr. Cormick responded to the subpoena duces tecum with a motion 
to quash the subpoena because it was unreasonable and oppressive 
under Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. l54 He also 
filed a motion for a protective order to limit the plaintiffs' inquiry to 
information that was not confidential. 155 This subpoena duces tecum 
was the first step in the plaintiffs' legal challenge of the process by 
which the parties had reached the 1976 settlement agreement. 
The heart of the plaintiffs' claims was that the mediators "failed 
to consider adequately adverse environmental impacts and feasible 
alternatives to the 1-90 project, and that appellants denied to low 
income and minority plaintiffs residing in Seattle equal protection of 
the laws and due process of law."156 A United States Magistrate for 
the District Court of the Western District of Washington State used 
a balancing test of interests to conclude that the mediators were not 
required to disclose memoranda, summaries and other documents 
reflecting their work product that they had not already made pub-
liC. 157 The magistrate also granted Dr. Cormick's motion to quash 
the plaintiffs' request to depose Dr. Cormick. 158 The magistrate 
152 Subpoena duces tecum, Adler v. Adams, No. 673-73C2 (W.D. Wash. 1976). 
153 [d. 
154 FED. R. CIV. P. 45(b) says, in relevant part, " ... the court, upon motion made promptly 
and in any event at or before the time specified in the subpoena for compliance therewith, 
may (1) quash or modify the subpoena if it is unreasonable or oppressive .... " 
155 Motion to Quash Subpoena and Motion for Protective Order, Adler, 673-73C2. 
156 Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Review, supra note 69, at 2. 
157 Order on Motion to Quash Subpoena or for Protective Order 3, Adler v. Adams, No. 
673-73C2 (W.D. Wash. 1979) [hereinafter Magistrate's OrderJ. 
158 [d. at 4. 
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based this decision on the grounds that the areas of inquiry of the 
requested deposition would violate the confidentiality of the media-
tion discussions, and that the relevant data were already available 
in the environmental impact statement. 159 In a summary opinion, the 
United States District Court of the Western District of Washington 
State affirmed and adopted the Magistrate's order. 160 The court found 
that the "magistrate's decision properly resolve[d] the questions 
presented for the reasons stated therein. "161 
The holding in Adler is the first judicial decision regarding whether 
environmental mediators' written and oral communications made 
during the mediation process are privileged. 162 
In holding that environmental mediators and their communications 
are privileged from compulsory process sought by third parties dur-
ing subsequent litigation, the Adler court adopted the four-part 
balancing test suggested in Richards. 163 The Richards court em-
ployed this test in its holding that in a breach of contract and defa-
mation action where the plaintiff had sought to compel a third party 
university research assistant to disclose interview notes and the 
identities of plaintiffs' employees whom the assistant had inter-
viewed under a promise of confidentiality for a research project, the 
public interest in maintaining a confidential relationship between 
academic researchers and their sources outweighed the plaintiffs' 
interest in satisfying their discovery requests. 164 
The four guidelines the Richards court suggested for deciding 
between discovery and non-disclosure are: the nature of the pro-
ceeding; whether the deponent is a party; whether the information 
159 [d. 
160 Order on Application for Review of Magistrate's Ruling, Adler v. Adams, No. 673-73C2 
(W.D. Wash. 1979). 
161 [d. Although the dispute over the extension of 1-90 formally ended in 1976, 10 years 
later, the project is not completed. In 1981 the Washington State Legislature authorized up 
to 120 million dollars for construction, with the expectation that the federal government would 
provide a ninety percent match of the costs of the project. TALBOT, supra note 1, at 38. The 
highway department is building according to the mediated settlement agreement. [d. 
162 A major stumbling block in the use of the Adler decision by future litigants is that neither 
the magistrate's order nor the district court's summary affirmation is published. Thus, the 
precedent-setting decision will not turn up during a routine search. 
163 Magistrate's Order, supra note 157, at 3. 
164 71 F.R.D. 588, 390 (N.D. Cal. 1976) "Compelled disclosure of confidential information 
would ... severely stifle research into questions of public policy, the very subjects in which 
the public interest is greatest. " [d. 
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sought is available elsewhere; and whether the information sought 
goes to the heart of the claim. 165 The Richards court found all four 
of these considerations weighed in favor of the researchers. 166 
In holding that the defendant need not testify or release his mem-
oranda, notes, and summaries to the plaintiffs, the Adler court relied 
almost exclusively on the Richards decision. The Adler court first 
held that the mediator need not produce "[a]ll memoranda, notes, 
summaries and other documents prepared by Dr. Cormick, Ms. 
Leota K. Patton, or their colleagues or staff at OEM, and any other 
documents reflecting their work product, unless the document has 
previously been made available to the general public. "167 Here the 
court noted the existence of a substantial public interest in encour-
aging effective mediation techniques in settling disputes. 168 The Ad-
ler court then adopted the defendants' argument that requiring me-
diators to disclose confidential documents arising out of mediation 
would inhibit proper performance of mediators' duties and thus un-
dercut the effectiveness of the mediation process. 169 After the hold-
ing that public policy favors the fostering of effective mediation 
166 Magistrate's Order, supra note 157 at 3; Richards, 71 F.R.D. at 390. This test originated 
in cases involving the qualified first amendment privilege of newsreporters not to testify. Id. 
See generally Baker v. F. and F. Investment, 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir., 1972), cm. denied, 411 
U.S. 966 (1973) (first amendment rights would not be yielded to compel disclosure by a 
journalist of his confidential news sources where disclosure was not essential to protect public 
interest in orderly administration of justice, and disclosure did not go to the heart of the 
case). 
166 Richards, 71 F.R.D. at 390. The researchers prevailed on the first criterion because the 
case was a civil one and the researchers had not collected the confidential material in antici-
pation of litigation. Id. The court had no difficulty resolving the second consideration in favor 
of the researchers because neither the professor nor his assistant were parties to the original 
action. Id. The court also resolved the third criterion in favor of non-disclosure because the 
factual issues over which the parties disagreed could be resolved with access to the information 
the plaintiff's employees gave to the researchers. Id. The court also ruled for the researchers 
on the fourth criterion: whether the information sought went to the heart of the claim. Here 
the court held that the information the plaintiff's sought from the researchers was privileged 
because it was "largely supplementary," and did not go to the heart of the claim. Id. at 391. 
The Richards court based its decision not to compel the researchers to testify or produce 
documents on the liberal discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. "Rule 
27(b)(I) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes discovery of any relevant matter 
not privileged. Nevertheless the trial judge is invested with broad discretion in supervising 
the course and scope of discovery." Id. at 389. 
167 Magistrate's Order, supra note 157, at 2. 
166 Id. at 3. 
169 Id. at 2. Here the court also mentioned that a local rule, CR 39.1(d)(2}-(E)(3-4) estab-
lishing mandatory mediation in civil cases, and specifically calling for confidentiality in media-
tion, was instructive but not conclusive. Id. at 3. 
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techniques in settling disputes,17o the court turned to the common 
law to strengthen this conclusion. Here, the Adler court relied ex-
clusively on the balancing test suggested in the Richards case. 171 
The Adler court decided that the first and second criteria of the 
Richards test, the nature of the case, and whether the deponent 
was a party to the case, both weighed in favor of the mediators. 
Adler was a civil case, and Dr. Cormick was not a party to the suit.172 
The court also decided the third criterion: whether the information 
sought was available from other sources, in favor of the mediators. 
Here, ruling in favor of the mediators, the court held that "any 
information properly sought from [the mediators] is equally available 
from other sources, indeed, generally from the parties to this liti-
gation. "173 Finally, the court noted that it was not clear whether the 
information plaintiffs sought from the mediators was related to the 
legitimate issues before the court.174 Thus, the fourth criterion, 
whether the information went to the heart of the claim, also sup-
ported non-disclosure. 
The Adler court next held that Dr. Cormick need not disclose 
"[c]ommunications or other documents furnished to Dr. Cormick or 
his colleagues and staff at the OEM by parties to the mediation or 
their representatives .... "176 The court based this ruling on the 
same factors on which it held that documents produced by the me-
diators were privileged. 176 
Finally, the Adler court granted the defendant's motion to quash 
the subpoena insofar as the plaintiffs sought to depose Dr. Cor-
mick. 177 Here again the court relied on the discussion regarding 
whether the documents produced by the mediators were privi-
leged. 17s The court also noted that questions plaintiffs sought to ask 
Dr. Cormick during a deposition would more appropriately be asked 
of the parties to the mediation themselves. 179 Plaintiffs' counsel 
wished to depose Dr. Cormick as to "what was within the minds of 
the parties in initiating the mediation"ISO and "what were the under-
170 See supra notes 165-67 and accompanying text. 
171 Magistrate's Order, supra note 157, at 3. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. 
174Id. at 4. 
176 Magistrate's Order, 8Upra note 157, at 4. 
176 See supra notes 167-73 and accompanying text. 




1986] ENVIRONMENTAL MEDIATION 119 
standings of the respective parties as to the alleged ambiguities in 
the ultimate agreement. "181 The court also held that asking Dr. 
Cormick to disclose whom among the parties originally proposed the 
highway configuration to which all parties ultimately agreed, and if 
·it was Dr. Cormick, on what data did he rely, would violate the 
confidentiality of the mediation discussions. 182 The court noted that 
such information was only of questionable relevance because the 
environmental impact statement formally set forth the proposed 
highway design and relevant data. 183 
Three factors suggested that Dr. Cormick need not answer the 
question regarding what transpired during the open, public media-
tion sessions. 184 These three factors are: (1) the information regard-
ing the events at the meetings was available from other sources, 185 
(2) during the mediation process Dr. Cormick participated in both 
open and closed discussions; three years later he might not be able 
to remember who said what where,186 and (3) some of the records 
prepared by the mediators might summarize the public meetings, 
and the court had already held that such records were confidential. 187 
The remainder of this article will discuss the applicability of the 
Adler decision to the development of a common law privilege for 
environmental mediators. 
VI. ADLER AS PRECEDENT 
Most environmental mediators and commentators advocate that 
courts use a balancing test to find a privilege for environmental 
mediators.188 Although the balancing test the Adler court used led 
to a finding of confidentiality for the mediators and their notes, it is 




184 Id. at 5. 
186 Here the court noted that "[0 Jne of the plaintiffs allegedly tape-recorded portions [of the 
public meetings.]" Id. 
186 Id. 
187 Id. The defendant, Dr. Cormick, submitted to the court the following documents: Motion 
to Quash Subpeona and Motion for Protective Order, Memorandum of Law in Support of 
Motion to Quash Subpeona and Motion for Protective Order, Notes on Mediation and Confi-
dentiality, Affidavits of Dr. Cormick, Cornelius Peck, Professor of Law at the University of 
Washington, and Robert Coulson, President and Chief Executive Officer of the American 
Arbitration Association. 
188 Freedman, supra note 4, at 77; Memorandum in Support of Motion to Quash, supra note 
87, at 6. 
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cates an ex postfacto review to determine whether a privilege exists, 
and emphasizes procedural fairness over substantive policy consid-
erations. This approach is not widely recognized by the common law, 
and grew out of cases involving "qualified First Amendment" privi-
leges. 189 A better avenue for environmental mediators and courts 
desirous of developing a privilege for environmental mediators would 
be to base granting of the privilege on the common law balancing 
test such as the one recognized by Wigmore. 190 
The Adler decision is very narrow. It does not establish a privilege 
for all environmental mediators, but merely holds that the specific 
facts of the case warrant protection of the communications made 
during the mediation of the 1-90 dispute. A fundamental problem 
with the Adler court's use of the Richards test to decide the issue 
of confidentiality is that the test only allows for an ex post facto, 
case-by-case determination of confidentiality. Environmental media-
tors cannot rely on the Adler decision to guarantee confidentiality 
to the parties to a dispute. Instead, in the absence of a privilege, 
environmental mediators will have to continue to rely on the after-
the-fact discretion of judges. 191 Thus, parties entering into the me-
diation process will not know whether their confidences will be pro-
tected unless and until someone challenges the process and the dis-
pute ends up in court. This result is consistent with the express 
purpose of the Richards decision, where the court states that its 
aim "is not to create a privilege, but rather to achieve a balance 
between certain competing interests. "192 
This result, though, does not address the Adler defendants' central 
concern: that there be a guarantee of confidentiality before the par-
ties begin to negotiate. Such a guarantee is critical to the perfor-
mance of the mediator's role, and the success of the mediation pro-
cess. 193 The Adler court's holding also will not allay fears of potential 
189 Richards, 71 F.R.D. at 390. 
190 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2285 (McNaughton rev. 1961); see text accompanying note 115 
supra, for Wigmore's 4 fundamental conditions necessary to establish a privilege. 
191 Even a common-law privilege would not fully protect environmental mediators because 
of the possibility of judicial reversal. The most desirable scenario would be for the legislature 
to codify the privilege in a statute after the courts have established it through reasoning such 
as Wigmore's analysis provides. 
192 Richards, 71 F.R.D. at 389. 
193 Memorandum in Support of Motion to Quash, supra note 87, at 7. "Unless the parties 
are assured of the ability of the mediator to maintain confidences . . . they cannot reasonably 
be expected to share with the mediator their personal concerns and possible areas of accom-
modation." Notes on Mediation and Confidentiality submitted with Memorandum of Law in 
Support of Motion to Quash Subpeona or for Protective Order, Adler, No. 673-73C2. 
1986] ENVIRONMENTAL MEDIATION 121 
parties to future environmental .mediation efforts. Those familiar 
with the Adler case, expressed their concern that courts could scru-
tinize the communications made during their impending mediation 
efforts. 194 
After-the-fact adjudication of the issue of a privilege defeats the 
general purpose behind granting privileges-that accurate fact-find-
ing is promoted when the fact-finder has all the relevant information. 
Although the role of a mediator is not that of a fact-finder per se, a 
mediator's role requires him or her to know and understand each 
party's position to discover areas of agreement and possible accom-
modation. 195 To fulfill this role, a mediator must know all the facts 
of the disputed case. Thus, the general policy behind privileges 
supports a finding of privilege for mediators. Courts, though, tra-
ditionally have been reluctant to create privileges. 196 The reason for 
this reluctance is that creating privileges interferes with the ultimate 
fact-finder's ability to use all rational means for discovering the 
truth. l97 As the Court in United States v. Nixon stated, privileges 
are "not created lightly nor expansively construed for they are in 
derogation of the search for the truth. "198 In mediation though, the 
parties themselves act as the ultimate fact-finders and decision-
makers. Creating a privilege for the mediator would not decrease 
the parties' access to important information. Thus, as long as the 
parties to the dispute are fairly and accurately represented in the 
mediation process, the judicial reluctance to create privileges be-
cause they interfere with discovering the truth is not relevant. 
In the Adler case though, the plaintiff environmental and neigh-
borhood groups contended that their views were not fairly and ac-
curately represented during the mediation of the 1-90 dispute. 199 
Because of this lack of adequate representation, perhaps the 1-90 
dispute is one of the ninety percent of environmental disputes that 
commentators believe are not appropriate for mediation.200 Dr. Cor-
mick has written that when deciding whether a dispute is appropri-
ate for mediation, the first questions mediators and the parties 
194 [d. at 5. 
195 Memorandum in Support of Motion to Quash, supra note 87, at 7. 
196 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 233-84 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). See 
also 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2192 (McNaughton rev. 1961) ("AU privileges of exemption 
from this duty [to testify] are exceptional, and are therefore to be discountenanced.") (em-
phasis in original). 
197 Elkins, 364 U.S. at 234 (Frankfurter J., dissenting). 
198 418 U.S. at 710. 
199 See supra note 86. 
200 See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
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should ask themselves are, whether "all the parties who have a stake 
in the outcome of the negotiations [are] represented," and "[i]s any 
party excluded that would prevent an agreement from being carried 
out?"201 The participants in the mediation of the 1-90 dispute would 
have to decide both of these questions against mediating. In the 
Adler case, neither side disputed that the plaintiffs had a major 
stake in the outcome of the mediation process. Nor did either side 
dispute that the plaintiffs could prevent the mediated agreement 
from being enforced. Why then did the mediators agree to mediate 
without the plaintiffs present? One commentator feels that it would 
have been better to include the neighborhood and environmental 
groups in the mediation process.202 But, because these groups re-
fused to be bound by a mediated settlement, and were unwilling to 
negotiate, the mediators achieved a "second-best solution"-agree-
ment among the affected jurisdictions-which the highway depart-
ment considered the minimum condition for proceeding with the 
highway extension.208 In spite of the Adler plaintiffs' lack of partic-
ipation, several factors may have made mediation the better choice 
for resolving the 1-90 dispute: the exorbitant costs of delay,204 the 
fear of losing government funding,205 and the possibility of being held 
up in the courts for another five years. 206 
Another problem with using the Richards test to create a common-
law privilege for environmental mediators is that the Richards test 
grew out of cases involving a "qualified First Amendment privilege 
of journalists."207 In Baker v. F & F Investment,208 where the court 
advocated using the test later relied on by the Richards and Adler 
courts, the issue was not whether a privilege should be granted, but 
whether to override a journalist's first amendment rights by com-
pelling him to reveal confidential news sources.208 The Baker court 
began with the assumption that the defendant's information was 
privileged, and then asked whether policy or procedural considera-
tions were compelling enough to outweigh this privilege.210 The 
201 24 ENVT. No.7, 14, 16-17 (Sept. 1982). 
202 TALBOT, supra note 1, at 96. 
203 [d. 
204 Connick and Patton, supra note 2, at 92. 
206 [d. at 94. In fact, in the summer of 1979, the Carter administration did (temporarily) 
halt all interstate highway funding as an anti-inflation measure. TALBOT, supra note 1, at 38. 
206 Connick and Patton, supra note 2, at 92. 
207 Richards, 71 F.R.D. at 390. 
208 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972), cm. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973). 
209 [d. at 779. 
210 [d. at 782--83. 
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courts in Richards and Adler, on the other hand, did not begin with 
an assumption of a privilege. Because of this difference in approach, 
it is important to examine carefully the criteria the Baker court used 
to determine if they are the best guidelines to apply to the Adler 
and Richards situations. The Richards test emphasizes procedural 
fairness more than substantive policy considerations. Not one of the 
four Richards criterion mentions public policy or the public good.211 
This approach conflicts with case law212 and commentary,213 both of 
which advocate that a tribunal consider public policy in developing 
common-law privileges. In his treatise on evidence, Professor Wig-
more asserts: 
[w]hen the course of justice requires the investigation of the 
truth, no man has any knowledge that is rightly private. All that 
society can fairly be expected to concede is that it will not exact 
this knowledge when necessity does not demand it, or when the 
benefit gained by exacting it would in general be less valuable 
than the disadvantage caused . . . .214 
Professor Wigmore suggests that the following four fundamental 
conditions are necessary to establish a privilege against the disclo-
sure of communications between persons standing in a given rela-
tionship: 
1) the communications must originate in a confidence that they 
will not be disclosed, 2) the element of confidentiality must be 
essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation 
between the parties, 3) the relation must be one which in the 
opinion of the community ought to be sedulously fostered, 4) the 
injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the 
communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained 
for the correct disposal of litigation. 215 
Case law also supports the use of such a policy-oriented balancing 
test. In his dissent to Elkins,216 Justice Frankfurter wrote, 
Limitations are properly placed upon the operation of this gen-
eral principle only to the very limited extent that permitting a 
refusal to testify or excluding relevant evidence has a public 
211 Furthermore, the Richards court is quite clear that it based its decision on the liberal 
discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure rather than on the law of 
privilege. Richards, 71 F.R.D. at 389 n. 2, 39l. 
212 See, e.g., Nixon v. United States, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
213 8 WIGMORE § 2192 (McNaughton rev. 1961). 
214Id. 
215 8 WIGMORE § 2285 (McNaughton rev. 1961) (emphasis in original). 
216 Elkins, 364 U.S. at 234 (Frankfurter J., dissenting). 
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good transcending the normally predominant principle of utiliz-
ing all rational means for ascertaining truth. 217 
If the Adler court had used such a policy-based balancing test, it 
would probably have more fully considered the policy arguments 
both for and against granting the mediators a privilege. By using 
the Richards test, the court avoided having to resolve directly the 
conflict of policy problem: the protection of confidences versus the 
public's right to know. Both Adler and Richards raise public policy 
concerns 218 but ultimately fail as precedent because they fail to 
resolve this key public policy problem. By using the Richards test, 
the Adler court did not, nor was it compelled to consider seriously 
the plaintiffs' public policy arguments. 219 
The Adler plaintiffs, who claimed they represented "the majority 
of the citizens of Seattle and every resident of Seattle who would be 
affected directly by the 1-90 project,"220 contended that no public 
policy supported the "secret decisionmaking" that invoking environ-
mental mediator's privilege would encourage. 221 The plaintiffs' most 
compelling public policy argument against an environmental media-
tor's privilege was that such a privilege would allow public officials 
to make decisions affecting their constituents without public scru-
tiny.222 The plaintiffs argued that "[s]uch a ruling would have the 
effect of permitting public officials, whose actions are otherwise (and 
properly so) subject to close and careful public and judicial scrutiny, 
to shield the decisionmaking process from such scrutiny, by hiding 
behind a screen of mediation . . . ."223 
Because of the nature of environmental disputes, granting envi-
ronmental mediators a testimonial privilege raises problems of ac-
countability, delegation, and due process, especially when the gov-
ernment is a party to the dispute. These problems need to be 
addressed before a testimonial privilege is granted to environmental 
217Id. 
218 See supra, notes 166-70 and accompanying text. 
219 For example, in support of their contention that no public policy supports mediators' 
privilege, the Adler plaintiffs cited to Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 4()1 U.S. 
402 (1971) (administrative decisions must be based upon complete record), and HandgUards, 
Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 69 F.R.D. 451 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (danger that abuse of the attorney-
client privilege could convert corporate in-house counsel into privileged sanctuary for corporate 
records). Neither of these cases deals with mediators. The Adler decision does not address 
either of these cases. Nonetheless, if the Adler court has applied a policy-based analysis such 
as Wigmore's, it could, and perhaps should, have considered the Volpe case. 
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mediators. Possible solutions to these problems include statutes to 
license and regulate mediators,224 as well as statutes to limit parties' 
access to the mediation process. States could also enable their offi-
cials to &erve as environmental mediators, thus circumventing the 
problem of delegation of public sector responsibilities to the private 
sector. Another possible solution would be to fund environmental 
mediation efforts publicly,225 thus making environmental mediators 
members of the public sector. The main problem here would be to 
find a way to pay mediators without raising questions about the 
mediators' neutrality. 226 
Another reason for courts to use a policy-based test such as Wig-
more's to decide whether to grant a privilege, is that the test is 
recognized widely in the common law.227 Thus, courts might be more 
willing to find a privilege for environmental mediators using the 
more familiar Wigmore criteria than by means of a procedural fair-
ness analysis based on the Richards test. 
Also, the Wigmore test is less fact-bound than the Richards test. 
That is, the Richards test asks specific questions about the particular 
case before the court, such as "whether the deponent is a party, and 
whether the information sought is available from other sources."228 
Under the Richards criteria, it would be difficult to convince a court 
that all environmental mediator's communications should be privi-
leged. Environmental mediators may be parties to original actions, 
and not always is the information sought available only from envi-
ronmental mediators. 
The Wigmore analysis, on the other hand, asks more generally 
whether a type of relationship ought to be protected. Using this 
analysis it would be easier for courts to decide that the environmen-
tal mediator/disputant relationship is one that the community feels 
should be sedulously fostered, and that the element of confidentiality 
is essential to the maintenance of this relationship. 
The nature and importance of environmental mediation is such 
that, using Wigmore's analysis, courts might be willing to find that 
it is in the public's best interest to foster the environmental mediator/ 
disputant relationship without finding that all such relationships 
ought to be privileged. Three aspects of the environmental mediation 
224 See McCrory, supra note 6, at 64-77 for a discussion of methods for holding environmental 
mediators accountable. 
226 TALBOT, supra note 1, at 100-01. 
226 [d. at 101. 
227 Elkins, 364 U.S. 234 (FrankfurterJ., dissenting); Nixon, 418 U.S. 683. 
228 Richards, 71 F.R.D. at 390. 
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process that distinguish it from mediation generally such that courts 
might be willing to make this distinction are: the potential significant 
and permanent impact of the resolutions of many environmental 
disputes, the involvement of public agencies in a large number of 
environmental disputes, and the tremendous expenses and amounts 
of time necessary to litigate environmental disputes. 
Under Wigmore's analysis anyone of these three factors might 
be enough to tip the balance in favor of a privilege for environmental 
mediators. First, the heavy public impact that most environmental 
problems exert on a community encourages speedy resolution. Be-
cause environmental mediation may be able to solve such disputes 
faster and more satisfactorily than litigation,229 courts should be 
willing to foster the environmental mediator/disputant relationship 
by protecting confidences made during environmental mediation, 
Looking at Wigmore's fourth condition: that the "injury that would 
inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communications must 
be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of 
litigation,"230 a court would most likely conclude that the carrying 
out of the win-win solutions such mediation ideally achieves231 would 
probably benefit the public more than a prolonged court battle to 
discover if the mediated settlement agreement is the "correct dis-
posal" of the problem. This is especially true in environmental cases, 
where very often nobody knows what the correct disposal is until 
many years after the dispute arises. 
Second, courts and the public ought to want to foster the environ-
mental mediator/disputant relationship because, as discussed in Part 
I of this article, litigating some environmental disputes is too costly 
and time consuming for the courts to handle effectively. A real 
danger exists that environmental cases may not be decided fairly 
and accurately if the courts do not overcome these administrative 
hurdles associated with litigating environmental disputes. Many 
judges do not have the time or technical expertise to wade through 
and comprehend all the data involved in complex technical cases, or 
even if they do have the requisite expertise, because of their heavy 
caseload, and the amount of information involved, it may take judges 
too long to reach equitable solutions. Encouraging environmental 
mediation by granting a privilege to environmental mediators will 
thus serve the public interest by relieving the courts of some of their 
more ponderous cases. 
229 See supra notes 45-54 and accompanying text. 
230 8 WIGMORE EVIDENCE § 2285 (McNaughton rev. 1961) (emphasis in original). 
231 See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
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If the Adler court had used Wigmore's test to determine whether 
the environmental mediators' communications during mediation 
should be privileged, the court would most likely have reached the 
same conclusion that it did using the Richards test; that is, that the 
mediator's communications were privileged. Nonetheless, because 
of the previously discussed differences between the two tests,232 the 
Adler court would have created a better, more useful precedent for 
the proposition that courts should grant environmental mediators a 
testimonial privilege. 
Under the first condition of Wigmore's policy-based analysis, the 
court would have had to ask whether the parties' confidences during 
the mediation of the 1-90 dispute had originated in a confidence that 
they would not be disclosed. At the outset of the 1-90 dispute, the 
mediators guaranteed all of the parties that "all confidential com-
munications would be kept confidential both during and after the 
mediation. "233 Thus, throughout the mediation, the disputants relied 
on this guarantee in disclosing confidential information to the media-
tors. 
Second, the Adler court would have had to decide whether this 
element of confidentiality is essential to the full and satisfactory 
maintenance of the relationship between the parties. Based on the 
Adler court's decision, it seems very likely that, had the court ad-
dressed this question, it would have found that the element of con-
fidentiality was essential to the mediator/disputant relationship. The 
Adler court held that "requiring a mediator to make such a disclosure 
[of confidences] would severely inhibit the proper performance of his 
or her duties, and thereby undercut the effectiveness of the media-
tion process. "234 The Adler court went on to address Wigmore's third 
condition: whether in the opinion of the community the relation ought 
to be fostered. Here, the court held that "[t]here is a substantial 
public interest in fostering effective mediation techniques in settle-
ment of disputes. "235 Thus, it is quite likely that the Adler court 
would have decided that Wigmore's third fundamental condition 
weighed in favor of confidentiality. 
Finally, the Adler decision does not give many clues whether it 
would have found that the injury to the mediator/disputant relation-
ship by disclosure to the plaintiffs of the communications made dur-
ing mediation would have been greater than the benefit gained for 
232 See supra notes 229-31 and accompanying text. 
233 Memorandum in Support of Motion to Quash, supra note 87, at 5. 
234 Magistrate's Order, supra note 157, at 3. 
235Id. 
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the correct disposal of litigation. The facts of the 1-90 dispute 
though, warrant a finding that the public interest was better served 
by allowing the communications made in mediation to remain confi-
dential. If negotiating among the parties had broken down, no high-
way would have been built until a court had decided on the merits 
of the entire case, which could have delayed action for up to another 
five years.236 In light of the admittedly unsafe condition of the pres-
ent roads linking Seattle, Bellevue, and Mercer Island,237 it would 
have not been in the public's best interest to have nothing done for 
another five years. Other factors the Adler court probably would 
have considered are the high costs of delay,238 and the possibility of 
losing government funding for the highway project. 239 
Also in balancing the concerns stated in Wigmore's fourth condi-
tion, the Adler court might have asked whether disclosing all the 
communications made during the mediation effort would have re-
sulted in a more correct disposal of the dispute. In cases such as 
Adler, there is no one "correct" solution. The best that courts can 
hope to do in such complex environmental cases is aim for the most 
efficient outcome, which is exactly the goal of mediation.240 From 
this, one can infer that the Adler court would have decided that 
Wigmore's final criterion weighed in favor of confidentiality. 
Thus, it is quite likely that the Adler court, having found that the 
1-90 dispute met all four of Wigmore's conditions, would have held 
that the environmental mediators' communications deserved to be 
privileged. 241 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The use of mediation to resolve environmental disputes has risen 
significantly since the 1960's. Because environmental mediation is 
such a new field, there are few statutory or common-law guidelines 
on the process. This Comment addresses one unresolved issue in 
environmental mediation: whether communications made during the 
mediation process are protected from compulsory process sought by 
third parties during subsequent litigation. Other judicial or statutory 
236 Cormick and Patton, supra note 2, at 92. 
237Id. 
238 Id. 
239Id. at 93. 
240 See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
241 "Only if these four conditions are present should a privilege be recognized." 8 WIGMORE 
EVIDENCE § 2285 (McNaughton rev. 1961). 
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privileges such as priest-penitent and doctor-patient turn on rela-
tionships that society would like to foster, and for which there are 
no alternatives. There is however a possible alternative to mediation: 
litigation. Thus, to argue convincingly that the environmental me-
diation process should be protected, environmental mediators must 
show that the mediation of environmental disputes is an activity that 
ought to be sedulously fostered, and in some cases, litigation is not 
a realistic alternative to mediation. 
In Adler v. Adams, the only federal case on this issue, a federal 
district court granted an environmental mediator a testimonial priv-
ilege, and held that the mediator need not disclose to third parties 
the records generated during the mediation process. Although the 
Adler court used a balancing test to find a privilege for environmen-
tal mediators, the test it used does not provide the best analysis on 
which to base this holding. A better test to reach the same conclusion 
is based on the four criteria advocated by Professor Wigmore. Pro-
fessor Wigmore's analysis emphasizes substantive policy considera-
tions, does not always require an ex post facto adjudication, and is 
recognized widely in the common law. 
